Policymaking under Influence

Abstract

Policymaking is an arduous process and politicians often fail to change the status quo despite their best efforts. I introduce the notion of influence players, an umbrella term for political actors such as interest groups, bureaucrats, or legislators who can affect positively or negatively the odds of implementation of policy proposals by exerting costly effort. Analysing a parsimonious model of policymaking with an imperfectly effective politician and an influence player, I show how and when threats, opposition, or support can affect policymaking, depending on the influence player's cost and strength of effort. Subsequently, I discuss empirical implications of the model, show that the relationship between the influence player's ability to shape proposals and her cost of effort can be non-monotonic, and highlight the importance of status quo policies. I conclude by describing perspectives the model provides on legislative politics, special interest politics, and bureaucratic politics.