Power Cascades

Abstract

We develop a model of coercive power and use it to explore when individuals exercise power in pursuit of a common goal. We define an individual's power as their ability to make credible, action-contingent threats of punishment. Building a simple model with multiple agents who can exercise power against a decision-maker, we demonstrate the possibility of power cascades, which arise when agents use their power because they expect other agents to do so. We show that power cascades tend to arise for decisions for which there are many "die-hard" agents who would use their power even if few others do. These die-hard agents can serve as the catalyst for a power cascade. Then, we illustrate how the possibility of power cascades can encourage agents to voluntarily delegate their power to a third party. Delegation essentially commits an individual to using their power, which can catalyze or extend a power cascade. This delegation incentive can lead a single party to accumulate substantial power in equilibrium.