Shifting Elites: State Formation, Absolutism, and the Thirty Years’ War

Abstract

This paper studies the role of external wars in the consolidation of states. In the context of the early modern Holy Roman Empire, we empirically trace the impact of the Thirty Years’ War on armies, bureaucracies, taxes, legislation, and deliberative institutions. Using novel data, we show that territories exposed to the war collected more direct taxes, expanded regiments, and did away with political participation of local elites in early parliaments. Once parliaments had been eliminated, rulers instituted standing armies, imposed indirect taxes, and increased legislative activity. At the same time, local elites became more likely to join the ranks of the bureaucracy and military, being absorbed by the nascent absolutist state. These findings can be rationalized in a multi-period model where constituents in need of protection can bestow centralized power upon a ruler, but the ruler might not cede this power in the next period. This decreases political participation of the constituents and can permanently shift the political equilibrium. We discuss cases of other European states in the light of this framework and provide empirical evidence on the long-run consequences of parliamentarism and absolutism for state performance in the 18th and 19th centuries.