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Corporate Lobbying in the European Union

Chicago, USA 27 June 2024 – 29 June 2024

Miguel Espinosa (Bocconi University); Nel Dutt (Bocconi University); Elie Sung (HEC)

E3 Political Organization and Lobbying
Chair: John Ahlquist
Room 0001
Strategy / Institutions and organizations in political economy

Abstract

Do firms gain benefits from lobbying? While firms often engage in markets in various countries, this fundamental question has been examined only in the context of national governments and mostly in the US context. To answer this question for corporate lobbying of institutions that span across countries, we focus on the EU, which is the largest single market, and present a novel dataset of firm-EU policymaker meetings spanning 2016-2022. These meetings, involving firms and EU policymakers like European Commissioners, Members of Parliament, and their staff, serve as a measure for lobbying activities. Next, to gauge the impact of lobbying on firm performance, we examine the likelihood of firms securing EU public procurement contracts. Our analysis shows that meetings are associated with a higher likelihood and value of winning European public procurement contracts. Consequently, lobbying is associated with a higher likelihood of material benefits for firms. Overall, lobbying is both active and expanding in the EU, with firms utilizing meetings as an effective strategy to secure contracts successfully.

This paper has been marked as unpublished by the author.