Institutional Diversity in Spectrum Sharing: Exclusive and Nonexclusive Property-Rights Regimes

Abstract

In the past several decades, spectrum policy in the United States has shifted from a case-by-case “command-and-control” framework to a “Coasian” framework, in which exclusive but flexible spectrum rights are assigned via market mechanisms. In this paper, we argue that the observation of both formal and informal spectrum-management practices necessitates a policy framework that allows comparative study across a wider array of governance structures, ranging from exclusive access to spectrum commons. We propose an alternative policy framework, informed by Elinor Ostrom’s research on polycentric systems, and use this lens to assess the viability of alternative spectrum-sharing solutions, particularly unlicensed spectrum. Our analysis suggests that “unassigned” spectrum bands -- i.e. communal ownership or private commons -- implemented within a flexible-licensing regime can mediate between the costs and benefits of exclusive and nonexclusive access.