Accountability under Polarization
Alberto Simpser (ITAM); Jose Ramon Enriquez (Stanford); John Marshall (Columbia); Horacio Larreguy (ITAM)
Abstract
In democracies, political polarization can weaken electoral accountability by shaping how citizens process information. We examine the impact of disseminating incumbent performance information on voting behavior in a polarized setting and assess the mitigating role of a debiasing nudge. We experimentally evaluate a local civil-society organization's Facebook ad campaign that delivered COVID-19 case and death statistics to over 2 million unique users across 500 Mexican municipalities ahead of the 2021 elections. Polling-station-level results reveal that the information alone backfired: it increased (decreased) incumbent support in areas with high (low) COVID-19 impact. These effects are driven by areas with strong prior incumbent support, prevalent communal values, and higher stress indicators among citizens. However, a debiasing nudge provided before the information reversed this effect, resulting in voters rewarding (punishing) incumbents with low (high) COVID-19 impact. Our findings underscore how biases in information processing undermine electoral accountability in polarized contexts and demonstrate the potential for nudges to restore it.