Sabotaging a Teammate without Reason:  Experiments on the Impact of Bonus Payments

Abstract

We conduct laboratory experiments to examine how sabotage behaviour in teams evolves in equivalent environments with and without bonus payments. We use a symmetric two-player coordination game where deviating from the efficient equilibrium represents sabotage behaviour, as it leaves a player's payoff unchanged but imposes positive costs for the other player. In our experimental treatments, the sabotage payoff is framed as resulting from a bonus, while in the control treatment, no bonus is involved. In a further treatment variation, we either frame the situation as a game with a rival or with a teammate. We find that introducing a bonus (without changing material incentives) and a rival framing both lead to more sabotage behaviour and harm efficiency. Our results suggest that bonuses can lead to more harmful sabotage behaviour even if they do not provide material incentives for it.