Political Animals: Layered Moral Agency and the Divergence Between Private and Public Norms

Abstract

I develop and test a model of \textit{layered moral agency}, in which individuals hold distinct private and public normative orientations. Public orientations evolve endogenously in the \textit{public sphere} -- via vertical deliberation with state agents (instituted-norm anchors) and horizontal deliberation with peers -- providing the normative foundation for formal rules. The model predicts that deliberative structure alone can generate pluralism, localized divergence, or norm collapse through cascades even with fixed private preferences. Using individual-level, geolocated panel data from Switzerland, I exploit within-individual variation in the normative composition of canton–year environments to show that endorsement of universalism responds systematically to normative exposure, with substitution between state and peer channels and stronger effects among those who privately value universalism. I then examine within-ideology consequences of endorsement, revealing when divergence across layers reflects ethical commitment versus strategic calculation. Finally, I isolate the vertical channel by following bureaucrats who move between private and public posts; within-individual evidence indicates role-based deliberative updating upon entry into public sector, consistent with instituted norm anchoring. Overall, the paper uncovers a richer form of rational agency and identifies the endogenous conditions under which universalism as a social norm persists or unravels.