Tuan-Hwee Sng (National University of Singapore); Jiahua Che (China Europe International Business School); John K.-H. Quah (National University of Singapore)
Abstract
We examine aristocracy as a form of political patronage, wherein rulers give favors to kins and adherents, whom we referred to as aristocrats. Our focus centers on the roles aristocrats historically played as administrators and their eventual displacement by impersonal bureaucrats. Contrary to prevalent portrayals in the literature, we contend that this system is not solely driven by an innate human inclination to favor one's kins and friends. Central to our theory is a fundamental tension between loyalty and talent. While both attributes enhance governance, sustaining talent requires repeated selection, which inevitably limits tenure and thus loyalty. Consequently, in societies with limited means to identify high-ability individuals, regimes strategically create aristocrats vested in the regime's survival through the offer of tenure. The advent of effective methods for talent identification could elevate the prominence of bureaucrats in governance. However, this transition would be gradual, as the enhanced quality of bureaucrats would bolster regime survival, thereby increasing the loyalty and efficacy of aristocrats. The efficacy of aristocrats also hinges on factors such as size of the ruler's territorial domain and the nature of administrative and transportation technologies. We employ our theoretical framework to shed light on the nuanced variations in the transition from aristocracy to bureaucracy in historical societies, exemplified by cases like China and Japan.