Back to 2025 Programme
Forecast Elicitation and Frequency Control
Sydney, Australia 24 August 2025 – 26 August 2025
Nawaaz Khalfan (Monash University); Guillaume Roger (Monash University)
A3 — Measurement, Incentives, and Methodological Innovation
Chair: Torsten Figueiredo Walter
Room UNSW Business School 205
Economics / Institutions and organizations in the public sector
Abstract
This paper outlines how appropriately chosen, state-contingent contracts can be used to incentivize forecast reporting in scheduled, stochastic markets, improving outcomes markedly. This is of particular importance for electricity grids, where market operators engage in frequency control by scheduling participants. These contracts are examples of scoring rules, and significantly differ from existing causer-pay frameworks. Scoring rules are more broadly useful in market design and can also be tailored to incentivize the further acquisition of publicly valuable forecasts.