Is There Really a Dictator’s Dilemma?

Abstract

We revisit the “dictator’s dilemma” identified by Wintrobe (1998). Wintrobe suggests that self-censorship driven by fear deprives the dictator of information he needs to govern and hold onto power. We argue in contrast that the dictator can manipulate information to reduce or eliminate this disadvantage. When the dictator is able to manipulate punishment to induce any level of self-censorship, the dilemma disappears entirely: in equilibrium, citizens behave as the dictator desires precisely when the dictator is ill-informed. In the more typical case, in which such perfect implementation is impossible, the dictator can employ propaganda alongside punishment to substantially offset the information asymmetry induced by self-censorship. Our results suggest that modern dictators are substantially less constrained than is widely understood. NOTE: This paper is an extension of the attached paper.