SPACE DEBRIS REMOVAL: GLOBAL PUBLIC GOOD GAME

Abstract

Since the late fifties when the USSR launched Sputnik, the first artificial satellite to orbit the earth, space activities have exploded: we have set foot on the moon, our robotic spacecrafts have reached Mars and asteroids; and satellites have much improved our lives, providing indispensable services for communication, navigation, and weather forecasting, just to name a few. Unfortunately, along with these achievements, dangerous space debris have accumulated and become a serious hurdle to future space activities. So far little has been done or planned to ameliorate the problem. This paper considers the global public good aspect of the space-debris removal problem. Other than the typical private incentive of an individual contributing country to remove some space debris, an additional issue prevents private contributions to clean up a public good. Namely, a “benefiting” country may have incentives to object to the specific removal behavior. We explain this “forbidding” behavior and attempt a game theoretical analysis of these interacting issues to stress that much international negotiation, agreement, and collaboration with the rest of the world is needed to solve this imminent space trash problem.