Wars, Taxation and Representation: Evidence from Five Centuries of German History
Andreas Ferrara (University of Pittsburgh); Sascha O. Becker (Monash University and University of Warwick); Eric Melander (University of Namur); Luigi Pascali (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
Abstract
We provide causal evidence for the role of conflicts in the development of representative institutions in Europe. Using novel data on the universe of German cities between 1290 and 1710, we show that involvement in wars resulted in city councils that were larger, had a higher probability of being elected by citizens, and a higher probability of guild representation. Additionally, conflicts led to a substantial long-term increase in local fiscal and spending capacity through the development of more sophisticated systems of taxation. We use the gender of the firstborn child of the best-connected local noble to instrument for conflict: a firstborn daughter increases the likelihood of conflict relative to a firstborn son.