Demobilization Through Inaction: Bureaucratic Delay, Ambiguity, and Collective Action

Abstract

I present a theory of how bureaucratic inaction can be used to defuse citizen mobilization. By holding open the possibility that a demanded reform will eventually be provided through institutional channels, authorities can create uncertainty about whether more radical actions are necessary. This reduces the incentives for contentious collective action and enables authorities to avoid having to resolve difficult distributive conflicts. I explore the predictions of the model using original archival data on the processing and outcome of over 4,000 community petitions for land redistribution in 20th-century Mexico (1915-1991). I show that bureaucratic delay often succeeded in defusing agrarian conflicts, that villages with a longer history of contentious collective action were better able to secure policy concessions quickly, and that backlash was more common where citizens were given. The data highlight the importance of local bureaucrats in determining the political outcome of the Revolution and illustrate how bureaucratic delay played a role in sustaining one-party rule alongside repression and redistribution.