Legislative Effectiveness, Trade Shocks, and Electoral Accountability

Abstract

Successful economies rely upon effective lawmaking. Representatives must be effective legislators---able to craft and pass new laws---and voters must choose to (re)elect these effective legislators, particularly when circumstances demand new laws. We analyze election outcomes from the U.S. House of Representatives, legislators' legislative effectiveness scores, and exogenous increases in import competition from China between 2002 and 2010. We document that trade shock exposure significantly reduces the probability of reelection of incumbents who have a record of being (relatively) ineffective legislators. On the contrary, for incumbents with a record of being effective legislators, the adverse effects of trade shock exposure largely nullified; for very effective legislators, trade shock exposure even improves their electoral fortunes. We provide evidence that this result is driven by trade shock exposure increasing voters' demand for policy change and, in turn, their support for more effective legislators. Our results have consequences for the effectiveness of future cohorts of legislators.