Compliance with International Law in a Dynamic Equilibrium

Abstract

Democracies tend to comply with international law in their interactions with other democracies. When autocracies interact with democracies or with other autocracies, compliance with international law is much less likely. This is why autocratic regimes tend not only to increase noncompliance with international law by their own actions but also to spread noncompliance in other states in their vicinity. In contrast, shifting towards democracy carries with it the advantage of better interactions with other democracies. This is why a shift to democracy usually happens in waves, with multiple autocracies that realize democracy will be better for all of them. The result is a dynamic equilibrium between the continual spreading of autocracy and noncompliance and waves of democratization leading to more compliance. This paper will begin to investigate how the dynamic equilibrium evolves over time, with a focus on the spread of non-compliance. The paper employs data about UN General Assembly votes to determine how practices of compliance and noncompliance tend to spread between states.