Campaign Progress Disclosure in Crowdfunding: Information Design and Counterfactual Evidence

Abstract

Equity crowdfunding platforms typically disclose real-time campaign progress, yet the effects of such disclosure on investor participation are theoretically ambiguous. While progress information may facilitate coordination, it can also discourage investment by revealing weak early traction. This paper studies how campaign progress disclosure shapes investor behavior using detailed administrative access-log data from Fundinno, the largest equity crowdfunding platform in Japan. We exploit the platform's two-stage design, consisting of a preview phase followed by a short investment window. During the preview phase, investors can inspect full disclosure materials but cannot invest. Once investment opens, they may return to the platform, observe current funding progress, and decide whether to invest. We develop a structural model in which previewers form private impressions of a campaign's attention potential during the preview phase, and subsequently make return and investment decisions based on these impressions and limited public information. The model separates two latent campaign characteristics: attention potential, which governs return timing, and an attention requirement, which determines investment. Using high-frequency user-level access logs, we show that early return and immediate investment behavior point-identify all model parameters. Counterfactual simulations indicate that progress disclosure has asymmetric effects: it reduces participation for campaigns that ultimately fail to reach their funding targets, but amplifies participation for successful campaigns. These results highlight how platform-designed disclosure rules function as a governance mechanism that shapes coordination and selection in equity crowdfunding markets.