Random Revolutionary Connections: Violence in the French Revolution 1789-1794

Abstract

In times of violent political upheaval, networks between key actors can play a role in their ability to survive. Connections could protect against prosecution or reprisals, provide information, or make it more likely that some individuals are targeted. However, personal networks are not randomly assigned, making it difficult to causally trace the role of such connections. The French Constituent Assembly of 1789 employed a remarkable procedure to quasi-randomly assign legislators to smaller groups. We employ variation in personal connections between deputies created by their as-good-as-random assignment and consider long-term outcomes in the ensuing revolution, such as violent death and emigration. Among the highly targeted nobility in the assembly, violent death was contagious. However, connections to two key leaders, Lafayette and Robespierre, were protective against violent death, encouraging emigration, regardless of their ideological differences. We argue that nobles drew an informational advantage from these connections.