A Theory of Illiberal Democracy and Political Transitions with Heterogeneous Policy Preferences

Abstract

We develop a model of illiberal democracies--i.e. formal democracies within which Elites manage to exert outsized influence. We use the model to better understand (i) the conditions that promote illiberal democracy, (ii) why illiberal democracy is harmful to, yet popular among, Citizens, and (iii) the nature of transitions between liberal democracy, illiberal democracy, and outright non-democracy. In the model, Citizens decide whether to resist Elite attempts at exerting influence. Elite influence has two main consequences: policy is distorted and the risk of transitioning to non-democracy is heightened. In understanding the popularity of illiberal democracy, we emphasize the role of economic and social heterogeneity among Citizens. Specifically, some Citizens benefit from the policy distortion, but all are harmed by the prospect of non-democracy. We show how the risk of democratic erosion leading to illiberal democracy increases as the Elite become weaker, and that the effect of mobility is nuanced. The model explains the relatively frequent transitions between illiberal democracy and non-democracy and shows how the existence of liberal democracy in fact relies upon these dynamics. We also provide some preliminary empirical support for our model from the World Values Survey and Polity IV data.